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Mongolia–Australia relations: a Mongolian 
perspective
by Mendee Jargalsaikhan
This year marks the 40th anniversary of Mongolia–Australia relations. The 
Australian Government will increase the number of scholarships for Mongolian 
students from 28 to 38 per year, open a trade office in Ulaanbaatar, and 
continue its developmental aid to Mongolia. Australia has provided more than 
$50 million in assistance to Mongolia, and 120 Australian Youth Ambassadors 
have served there.1 More than 300 Mongolians (who see themselves as 
‘Mozzies’), have graduated from Australian universities. The partnership 
between the sea-girt middle power and the landlocked developing nation is on 
the rise.
Traditionally, Australia’s foreign policy has been to prioritise developmental 
assistance to Oceania and Southeast Asia and consolidate its diplomatic 
presence in a few important Northeast Asian capitals. So why is Australia 
reaching out to Mongolia?
Modest but effective Australian educational investment and increasing 
business interests in the Mongolian mining industry underpin this partnership. 
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2Mongolia–Australia relations: a Mongolian perspective
However, despite the two countries’ similar foreign policy priorities and shared 
values of democracy and free markets, political and security cooperation is slow.
Background
The bilateral relationship was established amid the Cold War in 1972, although 
there was little interaction between the two nations for many years. Mongolia was 
closely allied with the Soviet bloc, and Moscow had strong leverage over Mongolia’s 
foreign policy.
When dealing with the communist bloc, the Australian Government (led by Whitlam) 
pursued policies that were more independent of the US than its predecessors 
had been. Australia played a bridging middle-power role by deepening relations 
with Moscow, granting diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China 
in 1973, and establishing relations with the Non-Aligned Movement in the 
United Nations.2 The ‘Whitlam government’s emphasis on closer relations with 
the countries of the Asia–Pacific region was,’ as Carl Ungerer argues, ‘both 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from the anti-communist thinking that had 
dominated the Menzies period.’3 Interestingly, when the Nixon administration was 
attempting to recognise Mongolia in 1973, US officials sought lessons from the 
Australian experience.4
Mongolia was seeking diplomatic recognition from other countries, especially middle 
powers. Positive relations between Australia and the Soviet Union in the early 
1970s enabled Mongolia to gain official diplomatic recognition from Australia a year 
before bilateral relations were established between Australia and the People’s 
Republic of China.
However, official recognition was not followed by any interactions between 
Canberra and Ulaanbaatar. Australian diplomatic efforts with the Soviets largely 
ceased as the succeeding Fraser government objected to the incorporation of the 
Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1975. As a Soviet satellite, Mongolia was 
unlikely to have any options other than to take a stance on Australia similar to the 
Soviet Union’s. Mongolia’s relationships with Asia–Pacific countries were limited 
to a few communist countries, while Sino-Mongolian relations ceased as a result 
of the Sino-Soviet confrontation for almost three decades from 1964. So Mongolia 
became politically and geographically inaccessible to the West while Australian 
relations with China forged ahead.
Mongolia’s political and economic transition in 1990 and pursuit of an independent 
foreign policy beyond its two neighbours provided favourable conditions for 
Mongolia to reach out to Australia. At the same time, Australia was in a position to 
pursue more assertive middle-power roles in international affairs.
Following its first multiparty parliamentary election in June 1990, Mongolia 
established a semi-parliamentary political system with extensive checks and 
balances among government branches and institutionalised protection of human 
rights (especially civil, religious and economic freedom). This distinguishes 
Mongolia from the Asian communist countries, including China, and enables 
Mongolian politicians to project the country’s new identity as a democratic state.
As Moscow ended its substantial developmental aid and withdrew its political–
military presence, Mongolia began to pursue an independent foreign policy by 
normalising its relations with China and reaching out to developed democracies, 
including Australia. Immediately after the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 
1986, and despite ideological differences, Mongolia established bilateral relations 
with the US and the Mongolian Foreign Minister visited Japan and Australia for 
the first time.5 After 1990, Ulaanbaatar formulated the National Security Concept 
and the Foreign Policy Concept, which highlighted Mongolia’s integration with 
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the international community and the need to strengthen democratic governance 
and promote the principles of free market economics. In addition to maintaining 
balanced relations with China and Russia, the Mongolian Government began to 
seek ways to strengthen its ties with the Western democracies and countries such 
as India, Japan and Turkey to reduce Mongolia’s dependence on its neighbours.
At the same time, Australia, as a middle power, was reaching out to places that 
had not appeared before on the Australian foreign policy radar. For example, the 
Australian Foreign Minister visited Mongolia in 1994 to explore opportunities for 
trade and investment in the Mongolian mining sector.6 Since then, bilateral relations 
have grown gradually. Mongolian President Ochirbat and Prime Minister Batbold 
visited Australia in 1997 and 2011, respectively, while Australian Governor-General 
Bill Hayden visited Mongolia in 1994. Since 2009, government leaders and cabinet 
ministers have engaged in bilateral meetings at the margins of multilateral forums 
such as the United Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Mongolia opened its 
embassy in 2008, while Australia accredits its ambassadors in Beijing or Seoul to 
Mongolia. In contrast to their ceremonial diplomatic recognition during the Cold War, 
Mongolia and Australia now engage in a modest collaboration in almost all areas of 
bilateral relations.
Mongolian–Australian bilateral cooperation is indirectly expanding the perimeter of 
the Asia–Pacific region. Mongolia sits at the northern edge of Chinese-influenced 
East Asia and on the southern edge of Russian-dominated society. It marks the 
far-eastern flank of formerly nomadic Central Asian societies, including Afghanistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Australia also marks a frontier: the 
southwestern boundary of the Pacific. Both countries’ efforts to cooperate support 
their foreign policy objectives to integrate with the wider Asia–Pacific region.
In addition to vast territory and isolation, there are many other similarities between 
Australia and Mongolia. Both nations are parliamentary democracies that uphold 
human rights and the principles of separation of powers. However, Mongolia has a 
unicameral parliament, which appoints the prime minister and the cabinet with the 
consent of the president. The president, who is nominated by political parties with 
seats in the parliament, is elected through a direct election, plays important roles 
in national security, foreign policy and the judiciary, and holds veto power over the 
parliament and the appointment of the prime minister and cabinet members. Unlike 
in the Australian political system, political institutions in Mongolia are still in the 
consolidation stage and are facing many challenges of postcommunist transition.
Although Mongolia is less industrialised and has a smaller economy than Australia, 
both economies rely substantially on extractive industries and agriculture. 
Mongolia’s transition to free markets began in the early 1990s, when it underwent 
a painful period of ‘shock therapy’ under the instructions of international financial 
institutions.7 The privatisation of livestock has increased the self-sustainability of the 
rural population, but herders have suffered tremendously in natural disasters (zud, 
or extreme cold).8
As Chinese demand grew from 2000, Mongolia emerged as the closest supplier 
of mineral resources, especially coal, to the Chinese market. And with more than 
36 million livestock, Mongolia is perfectly located close to Russian and East Asian 
markets. Although animal husbandry and mining produce more than 70% of 
Mongolia’s GDP, both sectors are struggling to obtain advanced technology and to 
meet higher standards (the Mongolian Government is aiming to adopt European 
Union and OECD members’ standards from 2008). Mongolia and Australia will 
compete for export markets for mineral resources (coal and uranium) and meat in 
markets such as China and Russia.
Culturally, Mongolia and Australia are quite distinct. Mongolia is traditionally a 
nomadic society and Buddhism is the dominant religion; however, a recent census 
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shows that a substantial percentage of the population is atheist as a result of 
policies during the communist regime.
Mongolian culture has been enriched by three major factors:
•	 The main features of nomadic culture and lifestyle (self-sustainability, adaptability 
and mobility) have survived for centuries, even under the communist regime.
•	 Seventy years of Soviet influence has left lasting marks on Mongolian society 
because the entire nation-building process was directed, assisted and sustained 
with Soviet support.
•	 Mongolia has been widely exposed to different cultures and lifestyles in the past 
two decades.
This combination strengthens the symbols of nomadic culture but at the same 
time creates opportunities for Mongolia to expand educational and cultural ties 
with developed countries as well as with its neighbours. While there is increasing 
cultural and religious tolerance, Mongolia, unlike Australia, remains an ethnically 
homogeneous society with a 5% Muslim minority.
Educational investment
Until the late 1990s, Mongolia was a terra incognita for many Australians. Similarly, 
‘Crocodile’ Dundee (1986) starring Paul Hogan conjured up an exotic image of 
Australia for many Mongolians. Unlike many other former communist countries, 
Mongolia has no diaspora link with Australia. However, the Australian scholarship 
program has begun to contribute to a mutually beneficial long-term friendship.
One of the major challenges for postcommunist Mongolia was to restructure its 
government institutions under the 1992 Constitution and to develop a cadre of 
public servants to implement political and economic reform. Because of Mongolia’s 
sudden economic transition and the loss of external subsidies (which were mostly 
from the Soviet Union), the Mongolian Government was not initially able to provide 
funding to train its public servants. From 1921 to 1989, leading Mongolian public 
servants were educated in Russia and other Central and Eastern European 
communist states. But in the 1990s both Russia and China were unable to 
provide educational assistance to Mongolia because they were also in the midst 
of economic turmoil. Therefore, Mongolia asked for educational assistance from 
developed countries, many of which were new partners.
After repeated requests from the Mongolian side at high-level exchanges, Australia 
included Mongolia in the Australian Development Scholarships program and 
awarded 13 scholarships in 1996. Because of the effectiveness of the program, 
the Australian Government increased the scholarships to 28 in 2010 and 38 in 
2012 (Table 1).
Table 1: Australian Development Scholarships to Mongolia
Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Australian 
Development 
Scholarships
13 16 6 4 4 0 4 8 11 13 16 14 18 24 28 28 38
Australian 
Leadership 
Award 
Scholarships
2 10 8 8 7
Sources: AusAID reports; Peter Nolan, ‘Australian Development Scholarships: return on investment’, 
dissertation, 2011, University of Melbourne, Melbourne; Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
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At first, the scholarship program was administered by the Australian Embassy 
in Beijing, placing extra administrative and technical burdens on the staff. From 
2003 to 2008, the program was managed by an Australian Government contractor, 
Coffey MPW Pty Ltd, as the ‘Mongolia–Australia Targeted Capacity Building 
and Small Activity Facility’ (CaBSAF), along with other projects such as poverty 
alleviation. Upon the successful completion of the CaBSAF, the Mongolia–Australia 
scholarships program evolved as an independent developmental aid program. As 
Peter Nolan argues, the Australian Development Scholarships program produces 
positive results in bilateral relations and also brings high returns for Australian 
foreign policy.9
What explains this successful Australian investment?
First, it’s a joint program that meets Mongolia’s needs and AusAID requirements. 
The Mongolian working group of seven ministries and the Civil Service Commission 
needs to develop human resources for the public service, while the Australian 
side manages the scholarships (processing applicants, preparing candidates and 
monitoring funding). If the Mongolian side fails to nominate capable candidates, 
AusAID could easily shift the scholarships to its high-priority countries in Oceania 
and Southeast Asia.
Second, scholarship recipients must have at least two years of continuous 
full-time employment, be approved by their employing government organisations, 
and return to their current employers upon completing their studies. Although 
there were attempts to provide more scholarships in non-public sectors in 1997, 
when 13 out of 16 slots went to non-public applicants, they stopped from 2000. 
Perhaps, at that time, attrition rates among non-public candidates were high or 
public servants demonstrated more visible results. The program usually supports 
only one or two years of master’s level education, which is convenient for the 
employing organisations.
Third, the program initially targeted the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and 
Justice and Homeland Affairs, and was later extended to other ministries. As the 
number of scholarships increased from 2004, the competition was opened to all 
ministries and government agencies, which are now responsible for selecting 
candidates and providing career opportunities for graduates. Only the Ministry of 
Defense has not participated: it already receives substantial training and education 
aid from the US and other developed countries, and increased peacekeeping 
deployments since 2002 have required more personnel.
The Australian Development Scholarships program effects bilateral relations in 
several positive ways. Because most candidates have more than five years of 
experience in the government service and previous educational experience in 
Russia or Eastern Europe, they bring interesting out-of-region perspectives to the 
Australian host universities. Being exposed to the politics, economies and lifestyles 
of Russia and China, Mongolians can contribute greatly to Australian faculty and 
students’ knowledge of Inner Asia. Not only the Mongolian students but also 
their family members interact with Australians and other international visitors. At 
the same time, the ‘Mozzies’ disseminate knowledge about Australia among the 
Mongolian public.
In 1998, Mongolian graduates of Australian institutions established an alumni 
organisation, the Mongolia Australia Society (known as the Mozzies Association).10 
The organisation supports members of the Australian Young Ambassadors for 
Development and organises events with the Australian business community in 
Mongolia to build networks and support its members.11 As alumni advance to middle 
and higher level posts, government strategies and plans (such as the Government 
Action Plan of 2008–2012) increasingly reflect policies to develop mutually 
beneficial cooperation with Australia.
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Importantly, the scholarships program has provided equal opportunities for male 
and female applicants. This has helped to increase the numbers and quality of 
female public servants in Mongolia.
As former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans notes, Australian middle-power 
foreign policy ‘usually involves “niche” diplomacy, which means concentrating 
resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than 
trying to cover the field.’12 This applies to the Australian Development Scholarships 
program in Mongolia. As Mongolian graduates from Australian universities have 
built knowledge about Australia, the Mongolian Government has taken more active 
steps to deepen its ties with Australia. It has opened a consular office in Sydney 
(1997) and an embassy in Canberra (2008), increased government study group 
visits, and used the Australian scholarship program effectively. Mongolian graduates 
from Australian universities have encouraged their politicians and bureaucrats to 
see Australia as a developmental model, along with Canada and Singapore.
Economic interests
The Australian business community has driven Australia’s interest in Mongolia. 
Direct trade is small and complicated by distance, but Australian interest in 
Mongolian mining, in particular, grew between the Australian Governor-General’s 
visit in 1994 and Trade Minister Craig Emerson’s launch of the Mongolian mining 
projects report 2011. As important energy and resources exporters to East Asia, 
Australian miners can use their expertise and networks in the region to invest 
in the Mongolian mining sector, which is well placed next to China and close to 
resources-poor Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
To reduce its economic dependence on China and Russia, Mongolia pursues a 
so-called ‘third neighbour’ policy to increase its political and economic links with 
OECD members and India. Although it depends heavily on the infrastructure and 
markets of its neighbours, it avoids giving Chinese and Russian investors access to 
its strategically important ore deposits and infrastructure. At the same time, it seeks 
to introduce Western standards and technologies to reduce environmental damage 
from mining. Since 2000, civil society organisations, especially environmental 
protection groups, have intensified pressure on the government and politicians to 
make the mining industry more accountable for environmental damage. For its part, 
the Mongolian Government prefers making deals with Western investors, rather 
than with the state-owned enterprises of China and Russia.
The development of Oyu Tolgoi, Mongolia’s largest copper–gold mine, is an 
interesting example. Because the Mongolian investment environment was not 
well understood and the Chinese market was uncertain, BHP Minerals sold its 
exploration licence for the Oyu Tolgoi site to Canada’s Ivanhoe Mines in 2001, a 
few years after buying the licence. Although Ivanhoe tried to conclude a long-term 
investment agreement with the Mongolian Government, its attempts failed because 
of Mongolian domestic politics (such as the major political parties’ inability to reach 
a consensus and rising public anger about irresponsible mining) and possibly 
because of its poor public relations. In 2005, Robert Friedland, one of Ivanhoe’s 
owners, told a Florida investors’ conference that ‘We are building the biggest new 
mine in the world … The nice thing about this, there’s no people around … There 
are no NGOs … You’ve got lots of room for waste dumps without disrupting the 
population.’13 Politicians, civil society activists and media in Ulaanbaatar brought 
up cases of irresponsible mining practices in the US and developing countries. 
Only after Ivanhoe joined the Anglo-Australian mining company, Rio Tinto, 
and strengthened its pledges to Mongolia about its social and environmental 
responsibility was a long-term agreement signed in 2009. This example 
demonstrates the growing influence of civil society activists and the public in the 
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government’s decision-making, as well as the growing opportunities for Western 
companies prepared to commit visibly to corporate social responsibility.
According to the Australian Government, there are 171 Australian-invested 
companies and about 300 Australians working in Mongolia. Rio Tinto, BHP 
Billiton, Leighton, Xanadu Mines and Kumai Energy have significant Mongolian 
mineral leases and investment plans. Australian companies have lobbied the 
government to establish a permanent trade office in Ulaanbaatar, opened new 
business opportunities for other businesses, supported or sponsored trips and 
public-to-public engagements for Mongolian parties, and contributed to the general 
public’s knowledge about Mongolia.
The Mongolian side is beginning to see Australia as a developmental model with 
economic advantages similar to its own—abundant natural resources and livestock 
(plus tourism potential, to a lesser extent). Like Australia, Mongolia has rich 
deposits of coal and uranium, which are destined for Chinese and Russian markets 
(Mongolia is becoming one of the world’s main coal providers). It also has great 
potential to provide animal and crop products to East Asian markets.
However, Mongolia lacks expertise, investment and technology. As noted in the 
Australia–Mongolia joint statement of February 2011, Mongolia looks for Australian 
assistance in vocational education, agricultural development and a better legal and 
institutional framework for mining investments. Since 2008, Mongolia has been 
working with the European Union to localise EU standards, and with Canada and 
Australia to improve its public service.
Political and security ties
Despite the similar foreign policy and security objectives of Ulaanbaatar 
and Canberra, the political and security relationship is slow. This is perhaps 
understandable: Australia’s immediate areas of concern are Oceania and South and 
Southeast Asia, while for Mongolia they’re Sino-Russian relations and East Asian 
politics. However, the two nations pursue similar objectives.
Multilateralism underpins the foreign policies of both nations. Both nations support 
non-proliferation, disarmament, peacekeeping and human security norms (such as 
the International Criminal Court and the abolition of the death penalty). Both want 
to be active members of wider regionalisation efforts in Europe and Asia. Both are 
members of the European Union’s Asia–Europe Meeting, Asian partners of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, global partners of NATO, and 
members of the ASEAN Regional Forum. And both consider the US as an important 
partner in their national security calculations.
Proportionally to their economies, Mongolia and Australia make similar efforts 
in the security arena. Since 2002, Mongolia has been a solid contributor to UN 
peacekeeping operations and to coalition operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Kosovo. Despite its small economy and military, Mongolia has deployed more 
than 6,000 personnel to peacekeeping operations. While many NATO members 
have been reducing their commitment in Afghanistan, Mongolia has increased its 
contribution from a 12-man mobile training team to a 400-man contingent deployed 
with US, German and Belgian forces. The Mongolian military has also become an 
active partner of the US in the Pacific; for example, Mongolia’s Five Hills Training 
Centre is designated as a regional peacekeeping training centre and hosts annual 
bilateral and multilateral peacekeeping training events with the US.
So, what holds back political and security relations between Australia and 
Mongolia?
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For one thing, Australian politicians still see Mongolia as a faraway, relatively 
insignificant regional player. Australian reluctance to emphasise bilateral relations 
continues to reflect Gareth Evans’s assessment in the 1990s:
Mongolia, which is unequivocally a regional country, has had a fascinating history, 
not least since it rebalanced its relations with China and the Soviet Union in 1989, 
and abandoned communism in favour of multi-party democratic elections in 1990. 
But its tiny population of two million people and its land-locked developing economy 
mean that it will be a long time yet before it assumes significance in either regional or 
bilateral terms.14
Despite some changes in Australia’s stance towards Mongolia, bilateral political 
relations may remain nascent until Canberra establishes a political footing 
in Ulaanbaatar.
High-level interactions occur between military officers of both nations at regional 
gatherings such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, military chiefs’ meetings hosted 
by the US Pacific Command, and NATO summits, which now include NATO’s 
global partners. Mid-level military interactions happen during US-led coalition 
operations (with various headquarters, including the US Central Command), 
major multinational exercises in the Pacific (such as Cobra Gold and Balikatan), 
and hosted events such as the Mongolian military’s Khaan Quest peacekeeping 
exercise and the Australian–Thai Pirap Jabiru exercises. Both militaries have 
sent military delegates to those exercises since 2006. Australian and Mongolian 
military personnel now socialise during their study at US military schools and 
at regional venues such as the Asia–Pacific Centre for Security Studies.15 
Australia’s participation in the Khaan Quest exercise and sponsorship of Mongolian 
participation in Pirap Jabiru training in Thailand are some tangible results of the 
interactions between senior military leaders. Australia also offered opportunities for 
Mongolian staff officers to serve in the headquarters of the peacekeeping mission 
in East Timor, but because of technical and administrative problems that didn’t 
happen. Subsequently, in 2002, the Australian-led mission in East Timor welcomed 
a group of Mongolian MPs and military officials. The Mongolian politicians later 
lobbied for the passage of Mongolia’s first law on peacekeeping deployments. 
Like political relations, military-to-military ties between two nations appear to be 
constrained by both sides’ unawareness of their similar goals and opportunities, and 
by geographical isolation.
There might be many areas where both nations can benefit from inexpensive 
partnerships. For example, both benefit greatly from collaborating with the UN, 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, NATO, and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum. Mongolia has supported Australia’s bid for a UN Security Council 
seat and membership in the Asia–Europe Meeting, while Australia has supported 
Mongolia’s inclusion in international financial organisations and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum. Because both nations are sometimes seen as outsiders in many 
regional initiatives, especially in the Asia–Pacific, their joint efforts along with 
those of other like-minded nations, such as Canada and New Zealand, strengthen 
their hands.
Academic cooperation between universities and research institutes could benefit 
both. For example, Mongolia could contribute greatly in Australia’s understanding 
of the Korean Peninsula, Central Asia, the Russian Far East and north and 
northeastern China. Besides China and Russia, Mongolia is the only nation with 
close ties with both Koreas.
A final area for cooperation is peacekeeping. Although Mongolia has recently 
contributed to short-term peacekeeping operations, it lacks the expertise needed to 
develop strategy and policies for sustained deployments. Australian institutions and 
colleges could help the Mongolian military and civilian police to develop expertise 
for UN and coalition peacekeeping operations. For instance, Mongolia’s revised 
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peacekeeping law permits the deployment of civilian police and disaster-relief 
personnel for peacekeeping operations, but respective ministries and agencies lack 
expertise and training opportunities. Because peacekeeping training assistance 
provided by the US and other developed nations is legally restricted to non-military 
agencies, the Mongolian military’s peacekeeping expertise is not always relevant 
to civilian police and emergency personnel. The experience and expertise of the 
Australian Federal Police is certainly worth sharing.
Conclusion
Australia and Mongolia stand at the frontiers of the wider Asia–Pacific region. They 
share values (democracy and free markets) and goals (international peace and 
security). Although they’re separated by geography, an interesting partnership has 
been evolving over the past two decades.
Australia’s modest educational assistance program has strengthened Mongolia’s 
public administration, disseminated knowledge about Australia, and led to gains 
in Mongolia’s education, mining and agriculture sectors. Growing investment 
opportunities for Australian mining companies have begun to push the Australian 
Government’s diplomatic efforts beyond traditional areas of interest.
Despite a healthy educational aid program, political and security relations are still 
underdeveloped. From the Mongolian perspective, there are many areas in which 
Canberra and Ulaanbaatar could engage in mutually beneficial relations.
Collaboration between the middle power and the developing state supports their 
mutual objective of integrating to the wider Asia–Pacific region.
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